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GAMEs-NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was
founded in 1905 to provide a framework for amateur intercollegiate athletics in response to a public outcry against the "commercialism, excessive physical injury to student athletes, and
cheating by some participating schools."' NCAA membership
was offered to four-year colleges and universities that met specific academic requirements.2
Since its inception, the NCAA has expanded its membership
to approximately 850 colleges and universities, with voting members separated into three divisions according to the size of the
institution and the extent of its athletic program.' Despite the
fact that less than 500 schools play football and only 187 are classified as Division I programs,4 each school has equal voting
power.5 The NCAA's self-governing authority is derived from a
constitution and bylaws approved by the membership.6 While its
regulations affect members in all collegiate sports,7 the NCAA
has never attempted to regulate the television appearances of its
athletic membership in any sport except football. a
In 1952, the NCAA, as part of a comprehensive plan,' began
I Note, Tackling IntercollegiateAthletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655, 656
(1978).
2 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
3 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984). The number of
voting members reported by the courts has not been consistent. See Justice v.
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 361 (D. Ariz. 1983) (NCAA made up of 960 members).
4 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.Supp. 1276, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
Division I schools command the major collegiate football market. Id.
5 See id.
6 Id. at 1282. NCAA policies are instituted either at an annual convention or by
a 22 member council when the convention is not in session. Id.
7 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984). It has been
suggested that colleges and universities rely on the NCAA regulations "to promote
intercollegiate athletics, preserve the ideals of amateurism, and ensure that schoolsponsored athletic competition resists encroaching influences of commercialism
and professionalism that are alien to the paramount educational objectives." Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, IntercollegiateAthletics and Television Contracts: Beyond EconomicJustificationsin Antitrust Analysis of Agreements Among Colleges, 52 FORDHAM L.REv.
717, 718 (1984).
8 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984).
.)See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1284 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
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restricting the number of television appearances that each college football team could make.'" The NCAA claimed that a plan
was necessary to prevent a decrease in live attendance at football
games as a result of televised game exposure." The plan basically provided that once a contract was made between the NCAA
and a television network, the network sponsors would select the
games that would be televised during a particular time.' 2 The
resulting fee would then be paid to the participating teams and
the NCAA.' 3 From 1952 until 1982, the NCAA contracted with
only one network, which was selected through a bidding
process. "
Dissatisfied with the position that the NCAA had assumed in
negotiating the television contracts with the networks and sponsors, a considerable number of schools with major football programs and a group of football conferences joined together to
form the College Football Association (CFA).' 5 The University
of Oklahoma (Oklahoma) and the University of Georgia (Georgia) were members of the CFA. 16 The CFA's initial purpose was
to lobby within the NCAA on behalf of its own members for
greater influence in the contractual negotiations with the networks and sponsors. 1 7 In 1979, however, the CFA members took
a more aggressive approach and attempted to negotiate a sepaaff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984).
1o See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954-55 (1984). In 1951, a
committee appointed by the members of the NCAA reported that "television does
have an adverse effect on college football attendance and unless brought under
some control threatens to seriously harm the nation's overall athletic and physical
system." Id. As a result of that report, the NCAA commissioned the National
Opinion Research Center to conduct studies on the impact of televised football on
gate attendance. Id. at 2955.
11 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.Supp. 1276, 1283 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
12 See id. Originally, the proposed contractual agreement between the NCAA
and the networks was submitted to the members of the NCAA. Id. Each member
was then permitted to vote on the proposed plan regardless of whether they actually fielded a football team. Id. This practice was discontinued in 1977, and the
NCAA adopted a series of negotiation principles for use in contracting with networks and sponsors. Id.
13 Id.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 1285. Of the nearly 100 largest and potentially most profitable football

programs, 61 are members of the CFA. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147,
1160 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
16 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2954 (1984).
17 See id.
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rate contract with a television network.' 8 The CFA took the position that the NCAA did not have the authority to act as the
"exclusive bargaining agent on behalf of all [the NCAA's] members for the sale of television rights to college football games."19
Two years later, the NCAA Council responded by adopting an
"official interpretation" of a bylaw, which authorized the NCAA
to act as the sole bargaining party for football television contracts
for all its members.20
Nevertheless, on August 8, 1981, the CFA independently
contracted with the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC)
for the rights to televise its members' football games for the 1982
through 1985 seasons. 2' The contract allowed more appearances
and greater income per football team than the 1982-1985 NCAA
contract.2 2 The CFA contract was not to become binding until
September 10, 1981, in order to allow the individual CFA members the choice of withdrawing from participation.23 The NCAA
administration responded publicly by indicating that any CFA
member who chose to participate in the CFA-NBC contract
would be subject to disciplinary action.2 4 Oklahoma and Georgia
then brought an action in the Western District of Oklahoma seeking, among other things, injunctive relief from the threatened
NCAA sanctions. 2 ' Although the district court issued an injunction barring the NCAA from interfering in the CFA-NBC contract, the CFA was forced to withdraw from the proposed
18 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1285 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
19 Id. The district court found that prior to 1971 there was no explicit provision
in the NCAA's constitution and bylaws that empowered it to control the televising
of college football. See id. at 1285-86.
20 Id. at 1285. The interpretation provided in part that "[aMny commitment by a
member institution with respect to the televising or cablecasting of its football
games in future seasons necessarily would be subject to the terms of the NCAA
Football Television Plan applicable to such season." Id. Nonetheless, the CFA
members adopted their own television plan and authorized the CFA administration
to negotiate a separate network contract. See id. at 1286.
21 Id.
22 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2957 (1984).
23 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1286 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
24 Id. The chairman of the NCAA Infractions Committee stated that the CFA
members who participated in the proposed CFA-NBC contract would violate
NCAA regulations. Id. The district court noted that the NCAA's executive director
and assistant executive director declared that they "would seek expedited disciplinary procedures against [the] offending CFA schools." Id. The proposed sanctions
would not be limited to the CFA members' football programs. Id.
25 Id.
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contract because of inadequate member participation. 26 At trial,
the plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA television plan violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.2 7
The NCAA plan brought before the district court was essentially the same as its predecessors. 28 The NCAA had contracted
with the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and the Turner Broadcasting
Service (TBS) 29 for a specific number of national and regional
television exposures for each of its playing members during the
1982 and 1983 seasons.3 The fee structure was based on the
division to which the participating teams were assigned and
whether the television appearance would be national or regional;
the popularity of the participating teams with the viewing audiences was not a factor. 3 ' Thus, the individual college and university football teams had essentially no bargaining power over the
fee that they would receive. 2 The networks had to insure only
that the total amount paid to all participating teams would not
fall below a "minimum aggregate fee" established by the
NCAA. 33
Id.
Id. at 1281.
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2955 (1984). According to the
NCAA, the purposes of all its plans were essentially threefold:
to reduce, insofar as possible, the adverse effects of live television upon
football game attendance and, in turn, upon the athletic and related educational programs dependent upon the proceeds therefrom; to spread
football television participation among as many colleges as practicable;
[and] to reflect properly the image of universities as educational
institutions.
Id. at 2955 n.6.
29 Id. at 2956 & n.9. TBS paid $17,696,000 for the exclusive right to broadcast
NCAA college football games over cable television for a two-year period. Id. at
2956 n.9.
30 See id. at 2957. The plan required networks to schedule 82 different NCAA
members for a televised appearance over the two-year life of the contract. Board of
Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1293 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part and
remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984). Each network was to televise a football game on a minimum of 14 different dates; seven of
the broadcasts were to be nationally televised and six were to be regionally televised. Id. At least one network was required to broadcast a college football game
every Saturday during the fall season. Id.
31 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2956 (1984).
32 See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1289-90 (W.D. Okla.
1982), aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct.
2948 (1984).
33 See id. The district court found that the "minimum aggregate fee" was essentially the price per game recommended by the NCAA multiplied by the number of
games played. See id. The NCAA's recommendations were based on the participat26
27
28
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In an extensive opinion, the district court concluded that
both Oklahoma and Georgia had suffered antitrust injury that
was personal, direct, and substantial.3 4 District Judge Burciaga
agreed with the plaintiffs that the NCAA plan constituted illegal
price-fixing and held that the television controls were "per se violation[s] of section 1 of the Sherman Act." '3 5 He further held that
the NCAA's controls constituted an illegal group boycott against
both the horizontal buyers (networks other than ABC, CBS, and
TBS) and the horizontal competitors (nonmember college football teams). 6
ing teams' divisional classifications and whether the games were televised nationally
or regionally. Id. Both ABC and CBS agreed to pay "minimum aggregate fees" of
$131,750,000 over four years. Id. at 1291.
34 Id. at 1301-02. This injury gave the plaintiffs standing to sue under § 16 of
the Clayton Act. See id. at 1302. This section provides as follows:
Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue for
and have injunctive relief. . . against threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws . . . when and under the same conditions
and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will
cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity . . .and upon the
execution of proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss or
damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue ...
Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982) (original version at ch. 323, § 16, 38 Stat.
730, 737 (1914)). The court found that both schools had demonstrated sufficient
threatened action by the NCAA to warrant judicial intervention. See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984).
35 Id. at 1304. The court found that as a result of the NCAA's plan, the prices
paid to the participating teams did not reflect what would be paid to the same teams
in the absence of controls. Id. at 1293. The court illustrated this finding with an
example: the teams participating in a game carried by approximately 200 stations
nationwide received the same compensation as the teams playing a game carried by
only four local stations. See id. at 1291.
The court rejected the NCAA's argument that their controls had procompetitive effects. Id. at 1308. Judge Burciaga considered himself bound by the Supreme
Court's position that "[tihe anticompetitive potential inherent in all price fixing
arrangements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifications
are offered for some." Id. (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 351 (1982)). He also dismissed the defendant's contention that participation in the NCAA was voluntary. See id. at 1287-88. The court noted that "[a]s a
practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for institutions wishing
to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic program." Id. at 1288. In addition,
Judge Burciaga rejected the NCAA's argument that removal of its regulations
would result in the creation of a "power elite" group of large teams that would
dominate college football. Id. at 1310-11. He noted that several small colleges had
recently achieved increases in their televised football exposure. Id. at 1310.
36 Id. at 1312-13. The court found that the threat of expulsion from the NCAA
effectively prevented the plaintiffs from selling their product to the highest bidder.
See id. at 1312. Judge Burciaga compared the control that the NCAA exercised over
its football program to a classic cartel:
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Despite its finding of per se illegality, the court also examined
the NCAA controls under the rule of reason. 3 7 Because of the
unique market involved and the extensive inquiry already undertaken, 38 the court declared that the controls were "unreasonable
restraints on competition and therefore illegal." 9 Furthermore,
Judge Burciaga found the NCAA to be in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act,40 reasoning that the NCAA's role amounted to
a monopolization of the college football television market. 4 1
Like all other cartels, NCAA members have sought and achieved a price
for their product which is, in most instances, artificially high. The
NCAA cartel imposes production limits on its members and maintains
mechanisms for punishing cartel members who seek to stray from these
production quotas. The cartel has established a uniform price for the
products of each of the member producers, with no regard for the differing quality of these products or the consumer demand for the various
products.
Id. at 1300-01. The judge emphasized the NCAA's control over the available supply of football, its price, and its production limits. See id.
Judge Burciaga further determined "that the relevant market for testing
whether the NCAA exercise[d] monopoly power [was] live college football television." Id. at 1297. In making this determination, the judge considered several factors, including the product's availability, the limited number of television networks,
the feasibility of a substitute product, and the traits of the viewing audience. Id. at
1297-98. He noted that college football was available primarily on Saturday afternoons in the fall and that the viewing audience consisted mainly of males between
the ages of 25 and 49. Id. at 1300. Judge Burciaga pointed out that advertisers
were willing to spend considerably higher amounts in order to reach this audience.
See id. He also recognized that college football was "a unique product because of
its history and tradition, the color and pageantry of the event, and the interest of
college alumni in the football success of their alma mater." Id. at 1299.
37 See id. at 1313-14. "[T]he rule of reason requires the factfinder to decide
whether under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice [that is being
examined] imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Arizona v. Marlcopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) (footnote omitted).
38 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1314 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.C. 2948 (1984); see
supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
39 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1314-15 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984). The court examined "whether the challenged restraint 'is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition.' " Id. at 1314 (quoting Board of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)).
40 Id. at 1323. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony
. .. . Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (original version at ch. 647, § 2, 26
Stat. 209, 209 (1890)).
41 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1323 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd
in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 2948 (1984).
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In light of his determination that the NCAA had violated
both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Judge Burciaga held
that Oklahoma and Georgia were entitled to equitable relief
under the Clayton Act because their injuries were the direct result of the regulations promulgated by the NCAA. 4 2 Therefore,
he concluded that the contracts entered into by the NCAA on
behalf of its members with the three networks were illegal and
unenforceable.4 3 As a result, the court enjoined the NCAA from
acting as the members' sole bargaining agent with the networks
and from enforcing the provisions of its contracts against either
the NCAA members or the networks.4 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's holding that the plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the NCAA plans and regulations. 45 The court of appeals also affirmed the district court's determinations that the
NCAA plan constituted illegal price-fixing under a per se analysis 4 6 and that the plan was unlawful under a rule of reason analysis. 47 The appellate court, however, reversed the lower court's
finding that the NCAA's actual and threatened practices under its
plan constituted an illegal group boycott against those networks
that were not awarded contracts to broadcast college football
games.48 The court also remanded the case to the district court
The court based its conclusion on the NCAA's power to control prices, production,
and competition within the college football market. See id.
42 See id. at 1324.
43 Id. at 1326.
44 Id. at 1326-27.
45 Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104
S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
46 Id. at 1156. The court found that "the plan contemplates an impermissible
integration: a combination of virtually all the producers, actual or potential, of a
differentiated product - commercially salable intercollegiate football." Id. The
court deemed the restraints per se invalid because they were not narrow enough to
achieve the alleged procompetitive goals. Id. at 1154.
47 Id. at 1160. The court concluded that the NCAA's proffered justifications
were insufficient in light of the restrictions placed on the colleges and the purchasing broadcasters. Id. at 1159. But see id. at 1167 (BarrettJ., dissenting) (procompetitive effects justified plan).
48 Id. at 1160. The court observed that the relationship between the NCAA and
the networks was vertical and that each network was given the opportunity to bid
for television rights. Id. at 1160, 1161. Thus, the court concluded that there was
no indication of a conspiracy among the NCAA and the selected broadcasters to
"freeze out" other broadcasting networks. Id. at 1160.
The court also disagreed with the lower court's assessment that the sanctions
available against a member who chose to violate the NCAA television plan
amounted to a per se illegal boycott of the violating school. Id. at 1161. The court
of appeals stated that unless the sanctions were "a naked attempt to exclude com-
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on the grounds that the injunction issued below was potentially
overbroad and vague.4 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 50 and
affirmed the court of appeals. 5 ' The Court concluded that the
NCAA's plan restricted both its members' output and their ability
to respond to public preference.52 Consequently, the Court held
53
that the plan violated section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The evolution of per se analysis and the rule of reason began
in 1897, seven years after Congress passed the Sherman Act.5 4
The United States Supreme Court examined the legitimacy of an
arrangement under which eighteen railroads agreed among
themselves to establish the rates, rules, and regulations for carrying all of their freight traffic. 55 In United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association,56 Justice Peckham determined that such an arrangement was proscribed by the Sherman Act as a restraint of
trade 57 despite the railroads' contentions that their fixing of
prices had resulted in reasonable rates. 58 The Court concluded
petition, the antitrust implications of an expulsion sanction turn on the competitive
reasonableness of the rule being enforced." Id. The court refused to determine
whether the sanctions were competitively reasonable because it held that the television plan was illegal per se. See id.
49 Id. at 1161-62. The court observed that the injunction could be read to impose sanctions on schools that violated NCAA regulations not involving the television plan. Id. at 1162. The court of appeals also directed the district court to
reconsider the specificity of the injunction and reexamine the extent of the NCAA's
power to bargain on behalf of its members. Id.
Judge Barrett dissented from the majority's holding, arguing that the television
plan was justified under the rule of reason because of the NCAA's procompetitive
effect on intercollegiate amateur athletics. Id. at 1166 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
50 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 464 U.S. 913 (1983).
51 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2971 (1984).
52 Id.
53 See id. at 2954.
54 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
55 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 292-97 (1897).
The government alleged that the Association's daily freight charges of over $1000
restrained trade and artificially enhanced freight rates. See id. at 310. The Association denied the illegality of its arrangement and contended that the established
freight rate was reasonable and necessary to avoid financial ruin. Id. at 310-11.
56 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
57 Id. at 342. The phrase " 'restraint of trade' ...
[has] the same meaning
[under the Sherman Act] which [it] had at common law, namely, acts, contracts,
agreements, or combinations which operate to the prejudice of the public interests
by unduly restricting competition or by unduly obstructing the due course of
trade." Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 168 Wis. 400, 405, 170
N.W. 230, 232, cert. denied, 249 U.S. 610 (1919).
58 Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 310. The present version of § 1 of the Sherman
Act differs from the 1890 version only in terms of the characterization of the viola-
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that once a restraint of trade was established, the government
was not required to demonstrate that the restraint was based on
an illegal intent.5 9
This inflexible approach was radically altered fifteen years
later by Chief Justice White's landmark decision in Standard Oil
Co. v. United States.6" In that case, the Court considered an alleged conspiracy between several individuals 6 I and a large group
of corporations "to restrain and monopolize trade and commerce
in crude oil, refined oil and other petroleum products. ' 62 Chief
Justice White suggested that a standard of reason 6 ' be the measure by which a contract or combination undergo evaluation in
order to determine whether there was an illegal restraint of
trade. 64 Thus, the Court's opinion in StandardOil marked the formal adoption of the rule of reason 6 5 for analysis of alleged violation and the amount imposed for violation of the section. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982) with Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890).
59 Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 342. The Court demonstrated extreme deference
to the legislative branch by refusing to interpet the Sherman Act beyond its plain
meaning. See id at 340-41. Commentators have noted that the Court's strict interpretation of the Act, in "fail[ing] to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable restraints, was at odds with prior court pronouncements of what the public
policy of the country had been prior to passage of the Act." 1 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST LAw § 8.1, at 343 n.9 (1980); cf. Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 344 (White,
J., dissenting) (only unreasonable restraints of trade illegal under Sherman Act).
60 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
61 Id. at 31. John D. Rockefeller was among those individuals. 1 E. KINTNER,
supra note 59, § 8.2, at 350.
62 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 59, § 8.2, at 350. The net result of the alleged conspiracy was impressive:
Not only did the combination bring together previously competing parties, but it was also alleged that the combination engaged in discriminatory pricing and exacted discriminatory rates from railroads; that it
controlled several pipelines and perpetrated unfair practices against
competing pipelines; that it assigned certain districts to each of its subsidiaries and thereby destroyed competition among the subsidiaries; and
that it had engaged in industrial espionage.
Id.
63 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 59-60. ChiefJustice White posited that the standard
of reason used and applied at common law prior to the enactment of the Sherman
Act should be applied to post-Sherman Act violations. Id. at 60.
64 See id. ChiefJustice White concluded that unreasonable restraints were made
illegal in order to avoid the creation of artificial prices and to promote, rather than
restrict, the "free flow of commerce." Id.
65 Justice Stevens has credited Justice Brandeis with defining the rule of reason.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 n. 13 (1982). Justice
Brandeis defined the rule as follows:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine
that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
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tions of the Sherman Act. 66

The application of the rule of reason to price-fixing agreements was considered and rejected in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 67 In that case, twenty individuals and twenty-three
corporations were convicted of fixing prices and limiting the
sales of sanitary pottery. 6 The lower court had withdrawn from
the jury's consideration "the reasonableness of the particular restraints."'69 The Supreme Court approved the lower court's instructions and held that the alleged reasonableness of the prices
was immaterial to the determination of whether a price-fixing
agreement actually existed.7y Justice Stone stated that the
Court's opinion in Standard Oil should not be read to allow a
"reasonableness" approach to illegal price-fixing arrangements. 7

1

The use of per se and rule of reason analysis in antitrust actions has continued under the present Court. In National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States, 72 the Burger Court considered whether the establishment of rules that prohibited competitive bidding among the members of a professional society
violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 7 3 The code of ethics es-

tablished by the National Society of Professional Engineers (Society) specifically prohibited the discussion of fees between an
engineering firm and a client until a particular firm had been selected. 4 Under the Society's code of ethics, if a client continued
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse;
but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences.
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
66 See 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 59, § 8.2, at 354-55.
67 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
68 Id. at 393-94. The Court noted that Trenton Potteries controlled 82% of the
sanitary pottery manufactured in the United States. Id. at 394.
69 Id. at 396.
70 Id. at 396, 401.
71 See id. at 399. One author has suggested that the Supreme Court in Trenton
Potteries expressly adopted and applied the per se doctrine to price-fixing. 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 59, § 8.3, at 365; see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 345 (1982) (price fixing unlawful per se).
72 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
7"3 See id. at 681.
74 Id. at 682-83.
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to request price information after the member disclosed that he
was prohibited from divulging that information, the firm could
no longer be considered for that job.75
The Government argued that the refusal to disclose price information to prospective clients prevented cost comparison and
thereby restricted free competition.76 Justice Stevens, writing for
the majority, determined that although this requirement did not
constitute price-fixing, it was sufficiently anticompetitive for the
Court to forego a detailed market analysis.77 The Court held that
the agreement to refrain from price discussions was on its face a
restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 78
The Society maintained that its code of ethics was not unreasonable under the rule of reason because "competitive pressure
would adversely affect the quality of engineering. '79 Justice Stevens noted that this argument failed to take into account the fact
that the Society's code in effect substituted the "Society's views
of the costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace" and was inconsistent with the Sherman Act's underlying
competitive philosophy.8 0 The Court posited that the purpose of
antitrust analysis, whether under the per se method or the rule of
reason, "is to form ajudgment about the competitive significance
of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members
of an industry."'" Consequently, the Court declared that an an82
ticompetitive bidding policy could not be adopted.
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court once again considered the legality of an alleged price-fixing arrangement.83 In
BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 8 4 the Court ex75 Id. at 683-84.

Id. at 684.
Id. at 692. The determination of the relevant market for the purpose of market analysis "involves inquiries into a number of factors, including such characteristics of the industry as the geographic area in which it is available, the time at which
it is available, special characteristics of the buyers and sellers of the product, and
special characteristics of the product itself." Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.
Supp. 1276, 1297 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
78 ProfessionalEngineers, 435 U.S. at 693.
76
77

79 Id.
80 Id. at 695.
81 Id. at 692. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price

Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965).
82 See ProfessionalEngineers, 435 U.S. at 696-97, 699.
83 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
84 441

U.S. 1 (1979).
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amined the difference between "literal" price-fixing and pricefixing that was illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act.85
The arrangement under scrutiny involved the issuance of blanket
licenses8 6 by Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) and the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) for copyrighted musical compositions.8 7 By granting licenses and
distributing royalties, BMI and ASCAP functioned as middlemen
88
between the musical copyright owners and the potential buyers.
In return, they were paid "a percentage of total revenues or a flat
dollar amount."89 The Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS)
claimed that the blanket license was an illegal price-fixing arrangement because the composers and middlemen had joined together to determine a set price. 90
The district court dismissed CBS's complaint. 9 ' The court
92
of appeals reversed, finding the arrangement to be illegal per se.
Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, rejected the per se
analysis as improper, stating that an examination under that rule
must focus on "whether the [disputed] practice facially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output."9 3 Concluding that the blanket license should instead be examined under the rule of reason,9 4 the Court emphasized the procompetitive aspects of the
blanket license in the contractual relationship between copyright
owners and purchasers.95 In particular, the majority recognized
that simplified negotiations between copyright holders and potential users, substantially lower costs resulting from fewer negotiations, immediate use of applicable compositions once a license
had been granted, and an expansive choice of compositions were
See id. at 9-10.
86 Id. at 5-6. Blanket licenses "[gave] the licensees the right to perform any and
all of the compositions owned by the members or affiliates as often as the licensees
desire[d] for a stated term." Id. at 5. Typical licensees included radio and television stations. Id.
87 See id. The Court noted that "[a]lmost every domestic copyrighted composition" was held by either BMI or ASCAP. Id.
88 See id. at 4-5, 10.
85

89 Id. at 5.
90 Id. at 6, 8.
91 Id. at 6.
92

Id. at 6-7.

93 Id. at 19-20. The Court noted in passing that the per se rule should not be

employed unless there has been "considerable experience with the type of challenged restraint." Id. at 19 n.33.
94 Id. at 24-25.
9 ' See id. at 20-24.
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all advantages attributable to the use of the blanket license.96 Inasmuch as the use of a fixed price in a blanket license was determined to be "a necessary consequence of an aggregate
license, '9 7 the Court reversed and remanded the blanket license
arrangement for consideration under the rule of reason. 98
Three years after the Broadcast Music decision, the Supreme
Court once again examined an alleged price-fixing arrangement. 9 9 In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,' 0 the Court
considered whether the setting of fees by physicians for a particular group of patients constituted illegal price-fixing per se.' 0 I In
Medical Society, competing physicians agreed by a majority vote to
charge certain fees to patients holding insurance policies of particular insurers. 0 2 The Maricopa Foundation for Medical Care
(Medical Society), a nonprofit corporation organized to provide
an alternative to standard health insurance plans, "establishe[d]
the schedule of maximum fees that participating doctors agree[d]
to accept as payment in full for services performed for patients
insured under plans approved by the [Medical Society]."' 0 3 The
State of Arizona alleged that the establishment of the maximum
0 4
fee schedules constituted an illegal price-fixing conspiracy.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that "economic prediction, judicial convenience,

...

business certainty,"

and respect for the statutory language chosen by Congress mandated the application of the per se rule rather than the rule of reason. 0 5 He found that "the (per se] rule is violated by a price
96

97

Id. at 20-22.
Id. at 21.

98 Id. at 24-25. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the majority
should have analyzed the blanket license under the rule of reason. See id. at 25
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He contended that the blanket license represented economic discrimination in that a user was required to purchase the entire repertoire
of ASCAP and BMI even though they were actually interested in only a few selections. Id. at 30-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

,9 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1982).
100 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
101 Id. at 335-36.

Id.
Id. at 339. The maximum fees were determined by the multiplication of relative values (a specific number for each medical service) and conversion factors (the
dollar amount used to determine the cost of a specific medical specialty). Id. at 340.
102

103

The participating doctors were not restricted to treating only foundation-insured

patients, nor were they obligated to charge the maximum scheduled fee. See id. at
341.
104 See id. at 336. Approximately 40 attorneys general filed briefs ofamicus cuiiae

in support of Arizona's position. See id. at 334.
105 See id. at 354. The Medical Society urged the application of the rule of reason
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restraint that tends to provide the same economic rewards to all
practitioners regardless of their skill, their experience, their
training, or their willingness to employ innovative and difficult
procedures in individual cases."'10 6 Consequently, the Court concluded that the Medical Society's
arrangement clearly constituted
0 7
illegal horizontal price-fixing.

In NCAA v. Board of Regents,' 08 the Court again determined
whether an agreement that literally fixed prices could be sustained because of the nature of the industry involved.' 0 9 The majority of the Court in Board of Regents adopted a two-step
approach in analyzing the validity of the NCAA's television
plan. " 0 The Court first examined whether the restraints on price
and output imposed by the plan were unreasonable."
Because
the plan permitted an artificially limited number of television appearances 1 2 and usurped the individual college teams' bargainand argued that the fee schedules were procompetitive because they enabled the
sale of "a uniquely desirable form of insurance coverage that could not otherwise
exist." Id. at 351. The Court held that these justifications were insufficient to overcome the per se rule. See id. Justice Stevens noted that it was "a misunderstanding
of the per se concept" to argue that the Medical Society's price-fixing scheme could
be validated by a procompetitive argument. Id.
106 Id. at 348. The Court determined that the Medical Society's reliance on the
"literal price fixing" argument offered in Broadcast Music was misplaced because the
result of the Society's fee schedules was that a distinct group of individually competing doctors had agreed to render services at fixed prices irrespective of skill and
experience. See id at 355-57. The Court pointed out that the blanket license sold
in Broadcast Music "was entirely different from the product that any one composer
was able to sell by himself" and did not interfere with the individual copyright
holder's rights to negotiate separately with potential buyers. Id. at 355.
107 Id. at 357. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented. See id. at 357 (Powell,J., dissenting). He contended that the Medical Society's plan did not prohibit the participating doctors from associating with
other insurance plans or treating uninsured patients and therefore "foreclose[d] no
competition." Id. at 360 (Powell, J., dissenting). The dissent found the majority's
attempt to distinguish Broadcast Music unconvincing and argued that the insurance
plan involved literal as opposed to illegal price-fixing. Id. at 363-64 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
108 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
109 See id. at 2960-61.
110 See id.
I Il Id. The Court noted that the Sherman Act "prohibit[s] only unreasonable restraints of trade." Id. at 2959 (emphasis added); see Medical Society, 457 U.S. at 34143; Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 687-88.
112 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2959-60. As a result of the limitation, the quantity of college football available to the viewing audience was unresponsive to consumer demand. Id. at 2963-64. Artificial limitations on output have consistently
been found by the Court to be unreasonable restraints of trade. Id.; see, e.g., United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding horizontal restraint per se
violation of the Sherman Act).
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the Court

concluded that both price-fixing and horizontal restraints on output were clearly evident.' 14
The Court then decided whether to apply a per se analysis,
noting that "[h]orizontal price-fixing and output limitation are
ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se'
approach because the probability that these practices are anticompetitive is so high.""' 5 Determining that the per se approach
was inappropriate in this instance,' 16 Justice Stevens posited that
the NCAA was in "an industry [where] horizontal restraints on
competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all."" 7 The majority noted that the NCAA rules and regulations,
which required athletic and academic integration, preserved the
unique character of college football."' In the Court's view, the
NCAA's role in college football could be construed as potentially
procompetitive in that its existence actually expanded both the
viewing opportunities for sports fans and the athletic opportunities for participants.' 19 This recognition required an analysis of
113 See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960; see also supra note 36 (colleges were
unable to sell their product to the highest bidder).
114 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2963. The court noted that horizontal pricefixing is "perhaps the paradigm of an unreasonable restraint of trade." Id. at 2960.
See generally Medical Society, 457 U.S. at 344-48 (tracing development ofjudicial analysis of horizontal price-fixing).
115 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960; see also Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20
(circumstances which on their face show potential for curbing competition and output command application of per se rule).
116 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2960.
117 Id. at 2961. The decision to disregard the per se approach was "not based on a
lack ofjudicial experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact that the NCAA
is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on [the Court's] respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics." Id. at 2960 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
118 See id. at 2961. The Court also stated that not all of the NCAA's regulations
were objectionable. See id. All of the courts involved in this case consistently
praised the NCAA's "requirements of amateurism, setting playing rules and schedules, regulating athletic scholarships, recruiting, and coaching staffs." Gulland,
Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 7, at 721.
119 Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. at 2961. The measure of whether a regulation is
procompetitive is whether it has the tendency to "increase economic efficiency and
render markets more, rather than less, competitive." United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); see National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (focus should be on "challenged
restraint's impact on competitive conditions").
The Court noted that the increased television exposure that each college team
would have if the NCAA controls were lifted would benefit not only the television
viewer, but also the student athlete. Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. at 2970 n.68. Absent the controls, the athlete would receive more local exposure. See id.

1986]

NOTES

120
Justhe price and output restraints under the rule of reason.

tice Stevens stated that whichever approach the Court chose, the
focus should be on whether the restraint enhanced
competition. 121
The majority observed that the NCAA's pricing and output
restrictions were not responsive to consumer preference.' 2 2 The
NCAA's interference with the distribution and allocation of college football according to the actual desires of the viewing audience was fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of the
Sherman Act.' 2 The Court projected that, absent the television
plan, a greater number of football games would be shown in response to pockets of local interest. 24 Unrestricted televising
would also allow local advertisers to determine the price for the
product based on local consumer interest.' 25 Justice Stevens rejected the NCAA's contention that the plan lacked market
power' 26 and was therefore not anticompetitive, 127 observing
that the NCAA had assumed the sole bargaining position on be120 See id. at 2961-62. The Court examined the NCAA's justification because restraints on competition could be mitigated by sufficient procompetitive grounds.
See id. at 2961. See generally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979); Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
58-59 (1977).
The reasonableness of the NCAA restraints would be determined "based
either (1) on the nature or character of the contracts, or (2) on surrounding circumstances giving rise to the inference or presumption that they were intended to restrain trade and enhance prices." Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2962 (quoting
Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 690).
121 Board of Regents, 104 S.Ct. at 2962.
122 Id. at 2963-64. The Court relied heavily on the district court's determination
that the NCAA's establishment of a fixed price usurped the ability of the product to
react in conjunction with free market forces. Id. at 2963 & n.30.
123 Id. at 2964. Witnesses testified "that the consumers, the viewers of college
football television, receive absolutely no benefit from the controls. Many games for
which there is a large viewer demand are kept from the viewers, and many games
for which there is little if any demand are nonetheless televised." Id. at 2964 n.34
(quoting Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1319 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 2948
(1984)).
124 Id. at 2963 n.29.
125 Id. at 2963 n.30.
126 Id. at 2965. The Court indicated that the NCAA's contention was mistaken as
a matter of law because "the absence of proof of market power does not justify a
naked restriction on price or output." Id. An entity with market power can raise
prices above those that would be set in a competitive market. Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 1566 n.46 (1984).
127 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2965. The Court further indicated that the
NCAA had clearly demonstrated the ability to set prices above those that would be
established in a free market. Id. at 2966; see also id. at 2967 ("When a product is
controlled by one interest, without substitutes available in the market, there is mo-
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half of the college football programs, which collectively were responsible for the existence of a unique product and a unique
audience.' 28 Given the NCAA's self-created controlling position,
Justice Stevens concluded that the NCAA had the "heavy burden
of establishing an affirmative defense which [would] competitively justifly] 29[the] apparent deviation from the operations of a
free market."'

The NCAA attempted to justify its position by arguing that
the television plan was procompetitive under Broadcast Music.'
In distinguishing the procompetitive benefits found in Broadcast
Music from the NCAA's television plan, the majority focused on
the product at issue in both instances.'
The Court noted that
while the contested blanket license in Broadcast Music could not
have been marketed by an individual musical composer, college
football could be marketed by the individual schools absent
NCAA control.' 32 Thus, the majority determined that the price
and product restrictions imposed by the NCAA plan were unnecessary to market college football successfully.13 3 Justice Stevens
reasoned that the plan was effective only in protecting the sale of
tickets to live football games from the competition that would
result from unrestricted television contracting.13 4 The Court
deemed this protection to be inconsistent with the concept that
" '[T]he Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the
nopoly power.") (quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S.
377, 394 (1956)).
128 See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2966-67.
129 Id. at 2967.
130 Id.
131 See id. at 2967-68.
132 Id. The Court stated: "Unlike Broadcast Music's blanket license covering
broadcast rights to a large number of individual compositions, here the same rights
are still sold on an individual basis, only in a non-competitive market." Id. at 2967.
The Court also indicated that unlike the NCAA plan, the blanket license imposed
"no limit of any kind ... on the volume that might be sold in the entire market and
each individual remained free to sell his own music without restraint." Id. at 2968.
133 Id. at 2967-68. The Court refused the NCAA's argument that the plan was
necessary "to penetrate the market through an attractive package sale." Id. at
2968. The Court reasoned that because college football was a unique market, the
NCAA did not need a package to compete against imaginary competitors. Id. The
majority also indicated that if ready substitutes were actually available, "then certain forms of collective action might be appropriate in order to enhance [the
NCAA's] ability to compete." Id. at 2968 n.55.
134 See id. at 2968. Because of the plan's structure, many major television markets
would have to broacast nine hours of college football within a nine to twelve hour
period on nearly every Saturday during the football season. Id. at 2969 n.59. The
Court noted that such a plan was "not even arguably related to a desire to protect
live attendance." Id. at 2968 n.56.
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assumption that competition itself is unreasonable.'135
The NCAA next contended that the overall regulations it
had enacted provided a balance between the competing college
football teams. 136 Justice Stevens acknowledged that some of the
NCAA's regulations were responsible for sustaining the character
and integrity of college football.' 37 He maintained, however, that
the regulations before the Court were simply restraints on output
and pricing. 38 Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that the television plan was not designed to equalize competition; 13 9 the plan
did "not regulate the amount of money that any college may
spend on its football program, nor the way in which the colleges
may use the revenues that are generated by their football
140
programs."
Justice Stevens observed that college football was the only
NCAA sport that employed a television plan; all other NCAA
sports were able to maintain a basic competitive equality despite
the absence of price and output restrictions.' 4' Justice Stevens
agreed with the district court that output would increase absent
the NCAA regulations and rejected the NCAA's rationale that
"equal competition [would] maximize consumer demand for the
product."' 142 The Court therefore concluded that the NCAA plan
limited output and fixed prices without regard to consumer pref143
erence and without offsetting procompetitive benefits.
Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Rehnquist joined. 4 4 The dissent opined that the majority erred
in finding that the NCAA plan constituted price and output limitations.145 Justice White determined that the NCAA plan was justified in its maintenance of an integration between college
athletics and academics. 1 46 He posited that the product pro135
136
137
138

139

Id. at 2969 (quoting Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 696).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 2969-70.

Id.

Id. at 2970.
See id.; see also Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1284-85 (W.D.
Okla. 1982) (NCAA basketball maintained competitive equality without such restrictions), aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
142 Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2970.
143 Id. at 2971. Justice Stevens observed that "the NCAA ha[d] restricted rather
than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics in the Nation's life." Id.
144 See id. (White, J., dissenting).
145 See id
146 Id. at 2971-72 (White, J., dissenting).
140
141

188

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:170

duced by adhering to the NCAA regulations could not exist in a
perfectly competitive market, where "integrity" and "character"
14 7
would have to be sacrificed in the quest for the profits.
The dissent contended that the majority used an improper
measure of output and that no showing of an anticompetitive increase in price had been demonstrated. 1 48 Justice White observed that the NCAA's restrictions and regulations had resulted
in the creation of a new product-"exclusive television rights"which was "more valuable to networks than the products that
[the NCAA's] individual members could market independently."' 4 9 He maintained that the manner in which the NCAA
chose to redistribute the revenues produced by participating
members was justified by the need to maintain a competitive
150
equality between football programs.
Justice White also stated that under the rule of reason, the
NCAA plan was sufficiently procompetitive to justify its deviation
from free market competition.15'
He posited that the
noneconomic goals for which the NCAA tailored its regulations-the integration of academics and athletics, the maintenance of a competitive equality between the competing teams,
and the continued viability of athletic programs through the influx of football revenues-were all results that should have led
the majority to find the NCAA plan and regulations
52
reasonable.
An examination of the majority's reasoning in the NCAA v.
Board of Regents opinion discloses a combination of reliance on
traditional economic principles in concert with a recognition of
the important administrative role that the NCAA has historically
147 Id. at 2972 (White,J, dissenting). In criticizing the majority's holding, Justice
White averred that the majority had "trap[ped] itself in commercial antitrust rhetoric and ideology [while] ignor[ing] the context in which the restraints have been
imposed." Id. at 2974 (White, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 2975 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the Court
should have examined the effects of the plan on total viewership as opposed to
viewership on a local and regional level. Id. He stated that "it seems likely ... that
the television plan, by increasing network coverage at the expense of local broadcasts, actually expands the total television audience for NCAA football." Id. Furthermore, Justice White urged that the college football market "should not be
equated to the markets for wheat or widgets." Id.
149 Id. at 2976 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White reasoned that because a
larger audience would watch nationally televised games, advertisers would be willing to pay more money for fewer televised football games. Id.
15o Id.
151 See id.
152 Id. at 2977-79 (White, J., dissenting).
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played in the regulation of college football.' 53 The Court acknowledged the NCAA's need for broad latitude in pursuing its
administrative goal and observed "that the preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to
intercollegiate athletics and is entirely consistent with the goals
of the Sherman Act."' 54 The simple fact, clearly documented by
the district court, is that the NCAA television plan placed an artificial cap on the number of games televised and usurped the individual college teams' ability to bargain for the price of television
rights.' 55 For teams in the CFA, such as Oklahoma and Georgia,
this meant a significant loss of income.' 56
A college or university that fields a football team that commands a greater viewer participation should not be penalized by
having its potential earnings slashed through price-fixing. Much
more to the point, however, is that the viewers of college football
should be able to determine what games will be televised and in
what location. More local and regional games would be televised
absent the NCAA controls; thus, when the NCAA controls are
removed, the price received by each team and the number of
games televised nationally, regionally,
and locally will be depen57
dent on consumer preference.

While the NCAA's control of the prices that could be paid by
the networks for the television rights constituted price-fixing, the
majority correctly applied the rule of reason.' 5 8 College football
could not exist without horizontal restraints on competition.' 59
The Court noted that the NCAA rules designed to maintain the
integrity of college football "preserve its character, and as a result [enable] a product to be marketed which might otherwise be
See id. at 2959-61.
Id. at 2971.
155 See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 1982),
aff'd in part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948
(1984). The district court stated: "In short, the NCAA controls are a repeal of the
laws of supply and demand. Competition is eliminated, and the pernicious effects
of non-competition are present in abundance in the market of college football tele2
vision." Id.
156 See Note, Breaking Away from the NCAA: The Deregulationof College Football Television, 1984 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 596 (Board of Regents decision will result in additional
fees to CFA members).
157 See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2964-65 & n.37.
158 For a thorough discussion of the inappropriateness of per se analysis to the
NCAA, see Gulland, Byrne & Steinbach, supra note 7, at 722-31. For a general
discussion of why the rule of reason rather than the per se approach should be applied to price-fixing, see Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706 (1983).
151) Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
153
154
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unavailable." 6 0 Therefore, the Court correctly examined the restraints on price and output under the rule of reason. This disproves the dissent's claim that the majority treated the NCAA's
control "as a purely commercial venture." 161
The majority properly rejected the NCAA's attempt to rely
on Broadcast Music as a procompetitive justification for the restraints on output and price. The NCAA plan was unnecessary to
16 2
market the individual college football teams' television rights.
Unlike Broadcast Music, in which both parties recognized the necessity of a licensing arrangement, in this case the individual
teams, exemplified by Oklahoma and Georgia, believed that they
would receive more for their television rights if price controls
63
were lifted.
The NCAA's claim that the control over television rights was
essential to protect live ticket sales and maintain competitive
equality among teams was also correctly refused by the majority
as unjustified in law and in fact. 164 Under current Sherman Act
analysis, the NCAA could not seek to insulate live ticket sales
from the competitive effect of televised games because competition per se is not unreasonable.' 6 5
The fact that no other NCAA sport requires the imposition
of restraints to maintain a competitive equality undermined the
NCAA's purported procompetitive justification. This justification was further eroded by the fact that more games would be
televised according to consumer preference without the controls
that were imposed by the NCAA. 1 66 Thus, the NCAA's position
was inconsistent with the basis of the rule of reason: "equal com' 67
petition will maximize consumer demand for the product."
The dissent's attempt to uphold the NCAA's controls over
the price and output of college game television rights was based
substantially on the idea that the NCAA's regulatory role permits
"the continued availability of a unique and valuable product, the
very existence of which might well be threatened by unbridled
competition in the economic sphere."' 6 ' The dissent, however,
160 Id.

See id at 2971 (White, J., dissenting).
See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2967-68; Note, supra note 156, at 592.
163 See Note, supra note 156, at 593.
164 See Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 2968-69.
165 Id. at 2969.
166 Id. at 2970.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2972 (White, J., dissenting).
161

162
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failed to separate the NCAA's role in regulating the conduct of
members prior to the televised game from its role in restricting
the price and output level of that game for the purpose of television rights. In contrast, the majority was careful not to implicate
the NCAA's maintenance of academic and competitive standards
in its holding. 6 9 These rules and regulations are wholly distinct
from the regulation of a college team's ability to bargain for its
television rights with the networks. While college football games
are a unique product because of their ties with the historical traditions associated with academic institutions, the revenues produced from the sale of television rights are an important
resource, which should be regulated through consumer preference and a freely competitive market. 7 °
David Michael Fabian
169 See id. at 2961, 2971.

170 See id. at 2965, 2971. District Judge Burciaga stated that
it is cavil to suggest that college football, or indeed higher education
itself, is not a business. The colleges of the nation are in competition
for students, for faculty, for government grants, and for philanthropic
support. It is a big business and millions of dollars are involved. The
same is true of college football. It is a business, and it must behave in a
businesslike manner to insure its future viability. . . . Like any business,
the schools which play intercollegiate football seek to maximize revenue
and minimize expense while at the same time maintaining the level of
quality which makes their product attractive to the buying public.
Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1288-89 (W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd in
part and remanded, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).

